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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
THE ST~\.TE INSURANCE FUND,
administered by the Commission of
Finance of Utah,
Plaintiff,

vs.

Case No.

THO:JIAS L. DYKES, THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
and INTERMOUNTAIN SERVICE BUR.EAU, INC., doing business as Merchants Police,

7196

Defendants.

Defendant's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendants accept the statement of facts as
given in the Plaintiff's Brief on file herein, as correct
but deem it advisable to amplify said statement as
follows in order to make it complete.
The policy of insurance, involved herein, was issued by the Plaintiff to J. Martin Stock, dba "Merchants Police'' effective August 20, 1946 and continuing
until June 30, 1947 (Tr. 63, 64). Mr. Stock changed the
title of his business establishment from a privately
owned concern to a corporation about July 1, 1947 (Tr.
1
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80) but Mr. Stock still remained an active participant,
was president of the new company and everything remained the same except the fact of incorporation, even
the name of "Merchants Police" continued to be used
( Tr. 55, 80, 81). The employment. of the applicant, T. L.
Dykes, by the new company, known as the Intermountain Service Bureau, Inc., was in all material respects
by the same people and for the same purposes as
though he had been employed by J. Martin Stock personally. The only major change in the new company
was the change of name. In actual contacts and in actual
business, the name of ''Merchants Police'' was not
changed but was continued in use. The Utah State Insurance Fund, the insurance carrier in this case, insured J. Martin Stock, operating as "Merchants Police"
and when this policy lapsed they made no effort to advise the Industrial Commission of such lapsation. The
Utah Insurance Fund received an order which was
issued by the Industrial Commission to all insurance
earriers, demanding that a notice 'be given to the Industrial Commission of policy cancellations, based on failure to pay premiums; but in spite of this order, the
State Insurance Fund officers elected to ignore the Industrial Commission's order ( Tr. 70 to 73).
QUESTIONS INVOLVED
1. Was the Utah State Insurance Fund policy of
workmen's compensation cancelled when the employer
incorporated and changed its name?
2
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2. Was the order or motion of the Utah State Industrial Commission binding on the Utah State Insurance :B,und so as to continue the Funds Liability over
the period of time necessary to compensate applicant
Dykes for his injuries and losses'?

ARGUJ\IENTS
.A.RGUJ\IENT ON QUESTION NO. 1
As far as technical legal entities are concerned, it
is apparent that the only insurance policy involved in
this case 'vas written on J. Martin Stock dba "Merchants Police." At the time the policy was written, Mr.
Stock was no doubt the sole o"\vner and operator of
said concern. It is also apparent that the technical
employer of applicant Dykes was the corporation, namely the Intermountain Service Bureau, Inc. Therefore,
a serious question arises as to whether or not the difference in these two legal entities is sufficient or should
be allowed to exclude applicant Dykes from any recovery because of injuries or damage; whether or not
this situation should permit these persons or any persons or combination of persons in like situations to accomplish such a change of ownership or a change of
name so as to be able to avoid, whether intentionally
performed or not, their obligations under the Workmen's Compensation Act. Even though a separate concern was organized in this case, it is still important to
determine who the real employer was and whether the
mere change of name or the creation of a. new entity,
3
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with the same ownership and management, would of
itself relieve the real employer of liability (Melhus vs.
Johnson and Sons, (Minn.) 247 N. W. 2). In the case
now before the court, Mr. Stock was the real owner and
employer of all help in the original company. He continued as the president and was undoubtedly a prominent factor, if not the full owner and manager of the
new company. There is no evidence in the record to
show the respective interests of any stockholders in the
new company. Much was made ~f the fact that one Earl
Lowry was General Manager of the new company and
hired the applicant Dykes (Tr. 57, 58) but Mr. Lowry's
interest, whether as owner or mere employee in the ne"r
company, is not revealed nor was it sho"\\rn at any"
time in the record that the new corporation had any
assets. It was disclosed at the hearing, however, that
the new company continued with the same type of business, continued under the same name (Merchants Police) with no change in address, telephone number or
telephone listing and with little or no change in letter
heads or in methods of operation. In fact, it was specifically admitted that the only difference between the
old and the new company was the fact that certain
types of investigations had been added in the operations
of the new company (Tr. 55, 80, 81).
It is a well accepted principle of law that the corporate entity of an organization will be disregarded by
the courts when justice requires it (See 13 Am. Juris.
pg. 160, sec. 7; Fletcher on Corporations, vol. 1, sections
41, 44 and 45; Whipple vs. Industrial Commission
4
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(.A.riz.) 1~1 Pac. (~) 876: Horovitz on Workmen's Compens:ltion La,v, pg. 229). No corporation should be allo,ver to rover the true substance of an existing situation s.o as to render an undue advantage to one of the
parties and permit loss and damage to another, especially if the damaged party is "'"ithout fault. Certainly
applicant Dykes, in this case, had a right to rely on the
fact that compensation insurance was being supplied
and there is no fault on his part that any question has
arisen as to 'Yhether or not he was properly covered
and protected by workmen's compensation insurance.
The Defendants concede that in an ordinary case, no
fire, automobile or liability policy is assignable or transferrable to another owner because of our rules that such
policies are personal. The Defendants do not dispute
the cases quoted by the Plaintiff on this rule and further
concede that if the case before the court is a true, and
in all respects a case of an assignment of a liability
policy from one owner to another, without the approval
of the insured, then the Intermountain Service Bureau,
Inc., as the new owner of the Merchants Police business,
would not be covered under the original policy as originally issued. The Defendants submit, however, that
in reality there was no transfer of the business nor was
there a change of ''ownership or operation''; that the
mere change of entity should not be allowed as a means
of working an injustice in this case; and that the case
before the court is not a true case .of assignment of a
policy and a transfer of a business, insured by said
policy. Our problem is really a question as to whether
5
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or not the ''ownership and operation'' of the Merchants
Police remained the same to such .an extent that the
policy of workmen's compensation, written herein, was
not automatically cancelled as a result of the cancellation clause contained in the insurance fund policy. We
call the court's attention to the said cancellation clause
in the State Insurance Fund policy, which reads as
follows:
''If the employer shall transfer his or its
ownership or operation of the business insured
by this policy, this policy shall automatically become cancelled. '' (Italics ours)
A true assignment of a policy involves the actual
placing of a. new assignee in the p.ositio~ of the former
insured. It involves the actual switching of one person
for another and a changing of the personalities involved.
It is substantially the act of transferring all of .some
valuable interest or property to another person (Johnson .vs. Brewer, Ga. 68 S. W. 590, 591; Ormond vs. Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co., N. C. 58 S. E. 997,
998), or as may be more graphically explained, relative
to fire insurance policies, there must be a parting from
the property interest so that the former owner, after
the transfer, has no further interest or control (Couch
Encyclopedia of Insurance Law, vol. 6, section 1450d,
pgs. 5139 and 5142). In other words, the rule against
an assignment bec.ause of the personal element being
involved, serves no purpose whatsoever where there is
no change of personalities or where the identity of the
original insured remains the same in the new company.
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This is bera.use the issuance of any policy depends upon
the character of the insured employer as to his integrity,
prudence, caution and ability in the management and
operation of his business and in the selection of his employt'l'S. This emphasizes the Defendants' position that
there is in reality no transfer of business and no assignment of the policy involYed in this case. In. the original
j[erchants Police under I\Ir. Stock as private owner, it
'-ras his interest that ''Tas the subject of the insurance
and the insurance policy did not automatically cancel
on the incorporation of the new company because it
\ras still this identical interest and still Mr. Stock's interest that remained predominent and which interest
the policy continued to protect because of Mr. Stock's
continued relationship in the new company. In order
for the insurance fund policy to cancel itself, in. accordance with its own terms, as quoted above, the insured
employer had to "transfer", "ownership or operation"
of his business. The Defendants submit that there is
not a single 'Yord of evidence in the record revealing
the least intent or actual accomplishment of any part
of the ''transfer'' of any ''ownership or operation.''
On the contrary the evidence introduced does reveal
that outside the mere change in name, everything remained the same including the ''ownership and the
operation" and that there was no suggestion of any
"transfer," as required in the quoted cancellation clause
before it could become operative.
The Defendants have been unable to locate any
cases exactly in point 'vhere a change occurred from an
7
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independently owned private business to a corporation
but the Defendants have located several cases where
changes were made in partnerships. These cases involve
changes in personnel and changes of name, similar to
the case before the court. The courts held that these
slight changes involved no ''assignment to strangers''
but involved a retention of substantially the originally
insured parties and that insurance policy clauses voiding policies where real assignments are involved were
not operating in such cases. (See Couch on Encyclopedia of Insurance Law, vol. 6, section 1450p and cases
cited thereunder; also Wilson vs. Genesee Mutual Insurance Co., N. Y. 16 Bart. 511, 512). As a :first premise,
the Defendants maintain that the Plaintiff's policy did
not automatically cancel itself when the corporation
was formed in July of 1947; that the clause quoted
above, and as worded, does not apply to the facts in this
case for the reason that the clause in question applies
only where an actual transfer of the business and property to an actual third party or stranger results and
where there is an actual change in ownership or operation. Such a transfer did not occur for the reason that
the business continued with no changes as has been set
out above. Even though the incorporation of an organization does technically create a new entity, the Defendants feel that their position is further justified in the
fact that the law says no such move should be permitted
to work injustices upon others. Such a move, if supported by the courts would permit the hiring of new
men. under a new company· name, without protection to
8
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them, 'Yhich is exactly 'Yhat has happened in this case.
There is no evidence in the record of the financial standing of this ne"" company, and 'vhere corporations have
no assets and are excused by the mere change of name
from liability on policies of 'vorkmen 's compensation,
the final results to the employee are obvious. We maintain the employee needs better protection, that the law
grants it to him and he is protected under the rules as
given herein. If the creation of a corporate· entity is
all that is needed to avoid responsibilities and to work
injustices, a great field of fraud and disregard of human
rights would have legal sanction. Our courts, however,
have long been exercising the right to look beyond the
entity of a corporation to see that those evils mentioned
are not accomplished. . Our authorities in support of
these arguments have been quoted above. Again, in
conclusion on argument No. 1, we call attention to the
fact that the liability policy in question should not be
declared cancelled as of the time of the incorporation
of the new company.
ARGUMENT ON QUESTION NO. 2
The Defendants first premise, as indicated above,
1s to the effect that the liability policy did not automatically cancel and we now hope to support the argument that because of the failure of the Insurance Fund
officials to comply with the law and the duly adopted
.orders of the Industrial Commission of Utah, the cover . .
age of the insurance policy in question, continued over
to and included the time necessary to protect applicant
9
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Dykes and to make the Plaintiff liable for Mr. Dykes'
injuries and losses in accordance with its policy and
therefore, also liable in accordance with the decision
of the Industrial Commission of Utah, which decision
is the basis of this appeal.
Up until May 13, 1947, sections 43-3-36 and 43-3-37,
U.C.A., 1943 had been in force and effect but by a
mere inadvertence, said sections were left out of the
new insurance code passed by the 1947 legislature
(Chap. 63 Laws of Utah, 1947) and were thereby repealed. Section 43-3-36, being the important section in
this case, is herewith quoted and reads as follows:
''Every insurance company authorized to
transact the business of workmen's compensation
insurance arid occupational disease insurance
must write and carry all risks or insurance for
which application is made to it, which are not prohibited by the provisions of Section 43-3-22, and
any such insurance company assuming such a
risk shall carry it to the conclusion of the policy
period unless canceled, either by agreement between the industrial commission and the employer
or in case of nonpayment of premium by thirty
days' notice by such insurance company to the
industrial comission and the employer.''
Through th~ above entitled section, before its repeal, the Industrial Commission of Utah was able to
compel all insurance carriers t~ let the commission lmo'v
when a policy of insurance lapsed for nonpayment of
premium or when a cancellation was desired or accomplished. By this law and this system the Industrial Com-
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mission performed a very worthy function and a great
service to the \vorking man by standing as a watchman
and protecting the employees on their liability coverage to \vhirh they are entitled by la\v.
\V.ith the repeal of this section, which in the history
of the Legislature was actually left out inadvertently
and for no other purpose 'vhatsoever, the Utah Industrial Commission \vas left without the direct authority
sufficient to continue to perform that particular service
and to know when liability coverage lapsed and employees \Yere not being protected. Very shortly after
the repeal, eYents occurred showing that a lot of serious
losses to employees were actually· resulting and would
continue to result if some steps were not taken to replace said law through some form of authorized action.
As a result of the Industrial Commission's effort to
perform the service referred to, to perform their obligations relative to keeping all employees insured and
to perpetuating, as far as was legal, the benefits
of this repealed section, an order or rule was duly
adopted by the State Industrial Commission on October
14, 1947 and copies thereof were sent to the Plaintiff
and to all other insurance carriers in the· state of Utah,
again requiring that the provisions of these sections be
followed and making it necessary, particularly, that
notice be sent to the State Industrial Commission of
any policies being cancelled for nonpayment of premium. For. reasons of time and space, said order is
not quoted herewith but is hereby incorporated by
reference and is to be found in the transcript of record
11
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on page 89. A copy of this order or motion was sent to
and was received by the Plaintiff and no objections were
ever raised by said Plaintiff relative to the requirements of said order until the hearing on this case ( Tr.
70 to 73).
The Defendants' first observation in relation to
said order and the provisions of the sections in question before they were repealed is to the effect that these
sections were in force and stiil effecti7e up to and including May 13, 1947 (see Chap. 63, Law·s of Utah, 1947).
It is further to be noted that the policy of insurance
issued by the Plaintiff to J. Martin Stock dba Merchants
Police was effective beginning 12 :01 A.M., August 20,
1946 ( Tr. 63). This means that the provisions of sections 43-3-36 and 43-3-37 were automatically included
and were part of the policy of the Plaintiff which was
issued to, and covered the Merchants Police and that
from this standpoint, alone, the Plaintiffs' own policy,
during all times herein, has made the Plaintiff responsible for the giving of a 30 days notice to the Industrial
Commission of any intent to cancel this policy or any
other policy for nonpayment of premium. It is a \Yell
established principle that the statutes of a state, applicable to any contract of insurance in force at the
time of the making of a contract, forms and becomes
a part thereof and must be read in construing the
policy and. said statute controls in case of conflict (see
44 C.J.S. on Insurance, section 302; also 29 Am. Juris.
on Insurance, section 108). This principle of law, alone,
makes the Plaintiff liable to the applicant Dykes under
12
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the terms of its O"\\Tn poliey. The Plaintiff makes a point
of the fnrt that the Utah State Insurance Fund is not a
rompany, that the ln\Y and the commissioners' order
specifies insurance companies as those required to give
notire and, of course, Plaintiff maintains that the insurance fund is not a company and is, therefore, not
required to giYe said notice. Insurance carriers go by
various names, such as companies, associations, underwriters, reciprocals and also by the name of insurance
and assurance and other names so that the use of such
a distinction to a~oid obligations under such provisions
as are here involved has never been supported by the
la.\v and should not be supported. In order to give purpose to the la'v there can be no doubt but that the term
''insurance company'' as in the sections above quoted,
applies to all insurance carriers. The Utah Insurance
Fund is no doubt properly classified as a stat~ institution, but the law is further emphatic about the fact that
state institutions must also abide by the law. State institutions should set examples to the public and certainly it must be said that neither the purpose of such
a la\v nor the good that results nor the harm that can
be done by either observing or failing to observe such
a law is lessoned or changed merely because a state institution is involved. The Defendant submits that the
Plaintiff is and should also be among those required
by the law or the order to observe its provisions.
Even if the Defendants should be left to their
rights, if any, under the order or motion of October 14,
1947, we desire to point out the following. The Indus-
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trial Comm.ission has no powers to legislate but they
do have the power necessary to accomplish the objects
of the State Workmen's compensation Act and to accomplish all the objects which are incidental to the
powers already granted to them (Utah Copper ·Co. vs.
Industrial Commission, 57 Utah 118). Further, the 1947
Legislature, effective as of May 13, 1947, enacted section
43-19-13 of Chap. 63, Laws of Utah, 1947, which section
reads as follows :
''All Insurance companies writing workmen's compensation insurance and occupational
disease insurance in this state, and the Commission of Finance in connection with its administration of the State Insurance Fund, shall be subject
to the rules and regulations of the Industrial Commission. Said Commission may provide the methods to be used by them in the payment of compensation and benefits. The Industrial Commission
may provide uniform rates to be charged by such
companies but such rates need not be uniform
'\Vith the rates fixed for the State Insurance
Fund.''
This section clearly puts the Plaintiff subject to
the rules, regulations and orders of the Industrial Commission so long as the Industrial Commission stays
within the limitations set out by our Supreme Court in
the Utah Copper case, supra, and the Defendants submit that certainly the purposes of the order is within
the purposes of the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act.
The practice of notifying the Industrial Commission or
comparable commissions in other states, of an inten-
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tion to cancel a liability policy is "'ell acrepted by most,
if not a1l stntl•s and courts. This practire has shown
itself to he a Yery essential factor to the more complete
performance of the Industrial Commission's function in
the supervising of 'Yorkmen ·s compensation la-\vs.
On page 10 of the Plaintiff's Brief, one Schneider
on \Vorkmen 's Compensation is quoted out of his Vol.
2, of said 'Yorks, Section 468, page 1588. The Plaintiff did not complete that author's quotation and the
Defendants submit the balance, which reads as follows :
''The provision of an insurance policy for
cancellation by sending to an employer at his last
known residence, a notice by registered mail 10
days prior to the time such cancellation takes
effect, and at the same time giving notice of cancellation to the compensation commission, as well
as the New York statutory provisions for cancellation are met, where a registered letter has
been sent and has arived at its proper destination
10 days prior to the date of cancellation, although
the name of the employer and the name of the
town are misspelled, and although the emplo~er
does not actually receive the notice, where he has
ignored notices that a registered letter is ready
for delivery, and it is returned to the company
nearly three weeks later; and where the commission was likewise notified of the cancellation
at the same time.''
See also 107 A.L.R., 1519.

15
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CONCJ..JUSION
In conclusion Defendants submit that there was no
automatic cancellation of the employer's policy in this
case for the reasons given herein, that the plaintiff gave
the new company until Nov. 12, 1947 (one day after applicant Dykes' first injury) to pay the premium and
before the policy would lapse. Further, the failure of
the Plaintiff to abide by the order of the Industrial
Commission makes said Plaintiff liable for applicant
Dykes' losses in accordance with the decision and award
of the Industrial Commission. That the Plaintiff is
liable under the law and the order of the Commission
because they are subject to the Commission's orders
and also because the law in question was in force when
said policy was issued. Defendants request that the
award and decision of the Industrial Commission be
.sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
GROVER A. GILES,

Attorney General
C. N. OTTOSEN,

Assistant Attorney General
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